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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

GERMAN PLANS FOR UNDERGROUND OPERATIONS FOLLOWING SURRENDER

Reference: a. J.C.S. 980 (Par. 2)

Note by the Secretary

1. The Joint Post-War Committee requests available information regarding German plans to operate underground following surrender of Germany.

2. Such information is requested as a matter of urgency in view of the current military situation. Data requested is also needed in connection with matters being considered by the Working Security Committee of the Department of State.

3. The Joint Intelligence Staff is requested to prepare a proposed response for the consideration of the Committee.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary

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GERMAN PLANS FOR UNDERGROUND OPERATIONS FOLLOWING SURRENDER

Reference: J.C.S. 980 (Par. 2)

Report by the Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch

THE PROBLEM

1. Available information regarding German plans to operate underground following surrender of Germany is requested.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

What are the German plans for operating an underground following the surrender of Germany?

The bulk of the German population will probably accept defeat and refrain from any active resistance against the occupying forces and authorities. There is little doubt, however, that the Nazi leadership will attempt to continue Nazi activities after the cessation of military operations. These activities will be directed

a. against the occupation authorities

b. against the native anti-Nazi forces in Germany.

Since the military and political situation after Germany's surrender will not offer any opportunity for Germany to fight for the reconquest of lost territories, Nazi resistance will concentrate on the following aims:

1. Disrupting and impairing the activities and policies of Allied Military Government.
2. Creating antagonisms among the occupying powers, especially between the Western powers and Russia.

3. Fostering conflicts between various social groups in Germany (for example, between business and labor, rural and urban population) in order to prevent the consolidation of a stable democratic front.

To accomplish these goals, the Nazis may be expected to work through two different channels:

a. "legally": through unidentified key men in the administration, in business, in cultural institutions, etc.

b. "illegally": through specially trained activists engaging in sabotage, individual terror, clandestine propaganda, etc.

This paper deals only with the second, the "underground" form of post-war Nazi activities.

The following intelligence reports may indicate the Nazi preparations for the post-war underground:

1. The Nazis have been training leaders for future resistance groups in the elite Party schools. These men, who are trusted Party members in Germany and in the occupied and satellite states, are relatively unknown to the public, and will thus be able to escape immediate detection. They are allegedly studying the obvious tactics of sabotage, coercion, and terror and especially the resistance of German groups against the occupation of the Rhineland by Allied forces and the methods adopted against the French in the Ruhr in 1923.

2. The Party has established a special organization--Abteilung IV, Reichssicherheitshauptamt--,to enroll trusted Party members as illegal fighters to carry out the NN Plan (Nach Niederlage Plan or Post-Defeat Plan). This plan is alleged to seek the integration and control of resistance in Germany as well as in all parts of the world under Nazi leadership. The Army is alleged to play a key role in this plan by attempting rearmament and military training and by making preparations for a future war. According to French sources of 1943, General von Stülpnagel, military commander in occupied France, was put in control of the Army's postwar activities.

3. Fostering conflicts between various social groups in Germany (for example, between business and labor, rural and urban population) in order to prevent the consolidation of a stable democratic front.

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3. The Nazis have transferred considerable sums to neutral states like Portugal and Switzerland to be used to finance subversive actions after the war by Party formations such as the Hitler Youth.

4. The Nazis are preparing a "last ditch" stand which calls for "permanent resistance" to be carried out by a series of centers of resistance in territories suited to guerilla warfare, like southern Germany and Austria. A few minor officials would be left in Germany to form a collaborationist government which would be made the scapegoat for the permanent resistance by the Nazi underground.

The thorough training and indoctrination of reliable formations during more than ten years of Nazi domination make the prospective Nazi underground a most dangerous and effective weapon. By virtue of their totalitarian control over all spheres of public and private life, the Nazis have numerous and varied facilities for camouflage and a large fanatical following. The possibilities for underground activities are therefore almost limitless and will be exceedingly difficult to suppress.

The success of the Nazi underground will to a great extent depend on the occupation policy toward Germany. The following factors will be instrumental for the effective liquidation of the Nazi underground:

1. Complete demilitarization; complete prohibition of all para-military organizations.
2. Thorough de-Nazification of all spheres of public life.
3. Non-cooperation with all groups which have actively supported the Nazi regime (especially among the old civil service and among the business leadership).
4. Restoration of free political life after the de-Nazification.
5. Cooperation with the native anti-Nazi forces, especially among labor groups, the Catholic Center Party, the Confessional Church, and the democratic wing of the middle classes.

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APPENDIX

The problem of the Nazi underground presents two aspects;

a. To what extent will the Nazi party, operating either as a clandestine group or in camouflaged form, be able to obtain the popular support in the German population necessary for the functioning of an underground movement.

b. To what extent will the professional activists be able to carry out acts of violence against the occupation forces, civil affairs officers, and any collaborating German groups.

I. Effect of peace terms and occupation on formation of an underground.

A. The nationalist reaction to the occupation.

1. Defeat, occupation and the terms of peace will cause a reaction among German nationalists which could easily be translated into acts of violent resistance. Any occupation policy which may be adopted will be considered as "harsh" by the professional activists as well as any group oriented in German nationalist traditions.

2. The number of Germans who will engage in resistance activity will probably be small in proportion to the population, but they will represent a professionalized and powerful minority which possesses ample means for carrying out acts of violence as a basis in German nationalism for securing an increasing amount of popular support.

B. The presence of professional activists in Germany.

1. Since the last war, numerous professional activists in Germany have received varied and efficient training in the methods of seizing political power by any means.

2. After the last war, the spontaneous reaction to defeat and demilitarization brought the formation of Free Corps, volunteer military groups determined to fight against any change in the German frontiers or the establishment of any government which accepted the terms of the peace. These corps, which fought against the revolution in Germany and against

the occupation forces in the Rhineland as well as the Poles and Russians on the eastern frontier, contained as many as 400,000 members in 1919-20. After 1920, they were gradually dissolved and became incorporated into the Reichswer or the Nazi Party or were officially suppressed.

3. Many activists in the Free Corps refused to accept dissolution of their groups and continued their activities throughout the Weimar period.

a. They founded a number of secret societies which engaged in illegal collection of arms and military training. These groups had widely different political orientations but sought the same objective of the revival of German power, the destruction of the peace settlement and the overthrow of the Weimar Republic. They developed a terror apparatus in the Feme murder, a device by which they punished any member who betrayed the secrets of the group. The members of the groups engaged in political murder, such as the assassination of Erzberger and Rathenau.

b. In 1922-23, the army attempted to integrate the members of the various clandestine groups into a secret military reserve called the Black Reichswehr. Many thousands were enrolled in this organization. In the Berlin district, over 18,000 members were under the control of former Free Corps leaders who were under the direct orders of the Army. The Black Reichsweher proved ineffective for two basic reasons: the army was not able to control secretly the political activitiesof the divergent groups which made up this organization; and secondly, the risks of the discovery of the army's connection with the Black Reichswehr were too great, both in terms of internal politics and international relations.

c. After the fight against the French in the Ruhr in 1923, the activists who had formerly operated in the secret groups and Black Reichswehr entered the Nazi Party where they used the same methods of subversion and terror to achieve their ends. The Nazi party, with its superior control apparatus, was able to integrate the work of the activists into the Nazi pattern. Those who could not be controlled were eliminated in the Blood Purge of 1934.

4. It may be assumed that after the present war there will be a far larger number of activists who are determined and prepared to resist violently than existed after the last war. In comparison with the illegal fighters of 1921-23, the activists after this war will be professionally trained by the many years of Nazi rule. They will have at their disposal a technique of terror and coercion developed in ten years of successful Nazi rule, a terror apparatus constructed by the Nazi party, and agents highly trained in espionage, coercion, and camouflage.

C. The extent of popular support.

1. The extent of popular support depends on the social conditions which exist in Germany, the nature of occupation policy, and the degree of cooperation of German groups with the occupation forces. The cooperation of the labor, Catholic, and liberal groups may be expected if a determined policy of de-Nazification is followed.

2. Regardless of the support of occupation policies by the great massof the German people, there will remain a large resevoir from which support of a resistance movement can be derived or activists recruited to engage in violence. The possible sources of a resistance movement may be summarized as follows:

a. Members of Nazi formations. Intelligence derived from prisoners of war shows the extent of their fanatical support of National Socialism and Hitler, the methods of espsionage they adopt in their organization and in the army to detect anti-Nazi elements, and the condescending attitudes towards Allied interrogation officers. The prevention of a Nazi underground will require control over the entire membership of Nazi formations.

b. Refugees in Germany. The Volksdeutsche who are sent to Germany from the neighboring states will provide a potential source for

an underground. They have been the spearhead of the Nazi movement throughout Europe since 1933, and their ejection from the mother countries (such as Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland) will probably strengthen their refusal to accept the fact of defeat and their will to resist military occupation. Likewise, the Reichsdeutsche who may be dispossessed by territorial changes, such as in East Prussia, will provide ardent personnel and support for a Nazi resistance movement.

c. Professionalized soldiers who have engaged in military activity and war for many years and who have no other occupation would provide support and personnel for an underground unless subject to control after demobilization.

d. Dispossessed social groups, such as the landed aristocrats, or any other economic group whose property has been wiped out during the war, ~~is~~ or expropriated by occupation policy, may be important in the detection of underground activity. This would also apply to the civil service.

3. Historically in Germany, activist nationalism has been more prevalent in rural areas than in urban centers, and in the German population, the greatest numerical support for reactionary nationalist movements has been among women.

II. Adaptability of the Nazi Party to Underground Activity

A. Existence of formations.

1. The Nazi Party has at its disposal formations and organizations which cover all phases of public and private life in Germany. While they may be formally dissolved and their leadership subject to punishment as determined in Allied policy, it will be difficult to prevent many of these organizations and formations from existing in clandestine form. It is not likely that they will go underground as mass organizations, but will consist of a few trusted members who will build secretly the skeleton

form of an illegal Nazi state able to coerce other individuals into supporting their objectives.

2. If this form is adopted, the Party will be following in modified form the policy which brought it to power in 1933. Prior to the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in 1933, the Nazi party formed a parallel government which included all the administrative functions carried out by the German state. It used subversive techniques as well as the legal means of popular elections. In Germany and in their foreign organization, the Nazis were successful in infiltrating into non-Nazi organizations and the state administration. Their position was assured by the fact that they did not hesitate to use threats and blackmail against other members in order to obtain support. The Nazis who infiltrated into various organizations were able to camouflage their identity until the time when it was expedient to reveal it.

B. <u>The existence of a terror apparatus</u>.

The Nazi party has at its disposal a well developed and efficient terror apparatus which could exist secretly. The Gestapo is accustomed to act secretly, and their methods could easily be adapted to the needs of an underground. The terror apparatus of an underground does not need to be large or extensive, as it will be able to use the simple weapon of blackmail, threat of exposure, and assassination to coerce Germans into supporting a resistance movement.

C. <u>The availability of arms</u>.

Military government will face a more complex problem than after the last war when the bulk of the arms were in army possession or under government control. Even with the cooperative German government in power it was impossible to prevent arms FROM coming into the possession of the Free Corps and secret military leagues. The Nazi underground will

be able to obtain and from the vast caches now scattered throughout Germany for the use of the police and security forces. The Gestapo has large collections of arms and secret arsenals in all parts of Germany. The various para-military organizations likewise possess caches of arms which would be difficult to detect. Prior to defeat, many arms may be secreted in homesof party members who are designated to carry on resistance. The only way at the present time in which the location can be detected is by the cooperation of German groups willing to disclose their location.

D. The possibilities of changed identity.

1. There are many opportunities in Germany at the present time to change the identity of individuals. The Nazi party has often done this in its espionage and counter espionage activities. It has regular facilities for the issuance of false papers to its various agents. Prior to defeat, the leaders of resistance groups could be provided with a false identity which would make their detection difficult, particularly in urban centers.

2. It is definitely known that the destruction of police records in the bombing of Germany has enabled many people to go elsewhere and establish a new identity. The Nazis will utilize this confusion in providing cover for their underground agents.

III. The possibilitiesof a neo-Nazi movement.

1. The progressive decentralization of the Nazi organization under the impact of war, particularly in matters of civil defence and local security, may provide an efficient post-war organization, seemingly non-Nazi but in reality, neo-Nazi in character.

2. A Neo-Nazi organization would of necessity have to exist underground until such time as it could emerge as a political group. Decentralization may provide a cover for an organization which would consist of

the smallest possible groups able to function independently with a minimum of communication with each other. This would imply that each group would be under the control of a leader specifically chosen for underground work.

3. The Nazi organization would cease to exist in its present centralized form and would maintain an apparatus only to exercise clandestine control over the local units in matters of grand political strategy. The local groups would be self sufficient in so far as leadership in day-to-day activities is concerned.

4. A neo-Nazi movement would not only carry out acts of violence against the occupation forces and civil affairs officers, but would combat violently any German government or group which collaborates with the United Nations. It would likewise seek a long-term policy of political power as well as the more immediate policy of terror. Key men would be placed in administrative offices and public associations in an effort to seize power at an appropriate time. In this sense, the possibilities of loss of identity for individuals would work to the advantage of a neo-Nazi movement.

5. The power of such a movement would lie in its ability to coerce important sections of the German population to support its objectives. The movement would work through groups which are not as compromised as the Nazi Party, as the old civil service and certain business groups, but which are susceptible to Nazi coercion and blackmail.

6. There are indicationsthat support for a neo-Nazi movement may be obtained from certain groups in business and state administration which avoid open identification with the Nazi regime. These groups may hope to constitute a reserve of prospective negotiators with the Allies. They may well become the backers of a neo-Nazi movement and support its underground activities.

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IV. Accumulation of foreign funds for Nazi purposes.

It is safe to assume that the Nazi Party leadership has always had the disposal of foreign funds for use without control of Reich agencies (especially the Reichsbank). The method and extent of German propaganda and political penetration into foreign countries before and during the war justify this assumption. Such funds are of course continuously replenished out of export proceeds. The volume of German export trade made it possible for Germany to secure foreign funds for payment of imports from neutral countries and all other purposes. In addition, there were large sales of gold looted from occupied countries, as is conclusively proved by reports from Turkey, Portugal, etc. There is no evidence that at any time Germany had been unable to export enough merchandise and gold into neutral countries to pay for her imports of strategic materials. The volume of these imports was limited only by Allied blockade measures. This is not disproved by the running up of clearing debts in Switzerland and Sweden -- Germany simply tried to get credit wherever possible.

The decision as to whether foreign funds are used for payment of imports or for Party purposes is a political one. Even at present, Germany should be able to spare foreign funds for Party purposes. Such funds are held by Party nominees, either German citizens or foreigners who act as Nazi agents in neutral or even Allied countries. The events of the last few months have probably increased the tendency of Nazi officials to accumulate foreign funds for private or political use. This is done by exports of gold, merchandise, jewels, objects of art, securities etc.

A CRS report from Madrid[1] claims that German firms (Siemens, Zeiss and others) are sending large quantities of industrial articles to Spain without requesting down payment by Spanish dealers. They ask only for payment when sold or reimbursement after the war, the money to be deposited in local banks. This is more important since Germany owes no money to Spain.

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1. European News Digest, 4 August 1944.

Swedish papers reported from Zurich[1] and Geneva[2] that Swiss banking circles were alarmed about recent large German gold consignments to Swiss and Portuguese banks. These transfers were not considered attempts to save private capital but a large scale campaign by the Party to accumulate foreign funds for financing of Nazi underground work after defeat. A later report from Switzerland did not confirm the above information. The following countries are the most probable depositories for Nazi funds: Switzerland and Sweden(where official and voluntary controls over foreign funds could be used to check various Nazi maneuvers); Spain (where cooperation of the government would have to be secured); Portugal (where the banks seem to be willing to cooperate with the Allies); and the South American countries (where Argentine constitutes the major problem).

Basically, prevention of the accumulation of foreign funds in the hands of Nazi agents is not different from measures conducted as part of wartime blockage of Germany. This might have to be continued for some time after the war to prevent the use of such funds for Nazi underground purposes.

V. The possibilities of concealment and camouflage.

A. Governmental and administrative agencies.

1. Since National Socialism has exercised a totalitarian regime for over a decade, it possesses many possibilities of concealment of underground agents in the governmental structure of Germany. Agents may be planted directly in the administrative services, or members of the administrative services may be coerced by the underground terror apparatus to support its cause.

2. The possibilities of concealment are probably greater in rural and local areas than in the national agencies since these may remain less changed than the national civil service.

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1. Aftontidningen, 19 June 1944 (Despatch Stockholm, 21 June 1944).
2. Ny Dag, 11 July 1944 (Press Intel Stockholm, 21 June 1944).

3. It is probable that agents will be planted in administrative services which by their nature are not subject to the same type of scrutiny and control as the more suspect parts of the administrative structure. Such services would include welfare and charitable organizations, fire brigades, rural police, etc.

4. In establishing controls over administrative services, it may be advisable to examine closely the personnel offices, and officers in order to prevent Nazi sympathizers from using their power to facilitate the infiltration of subversive agents. It is likely, however, that whatever planting of agents is done will be carried out prior to military occupation.

B. Group camouflage.

1. In the past the Germans have utilized successfully the technique of camouflaging their activities by the formation of various types of groups. This type of camouflage is utilized at the present time by the German anti-Nazi underground. It may be assumed that the Nazis will utilize this well-known technique in concealing their subversive actions.

2. The various types of probable group camouflage may be summarized as follows:

(1) Sports organizations. This is the most prevalent type of group camouflage utilized in Germany. It has been used by nationalists, Nazis, anti-Nazis as a cover for their real activities.

(2) Cultural organizations. There are unlimited possibilities for the formation of Kulturvereine in Germany, and thousands of them have existed in the past. Since the ideology of a neo-Nazi movement may be based on the historical precedents of Germah nationalism, it may be advisable to examine the organizations which are dedicated to the perpetuation of nationalistic traditions.

3. Academic societies. The National Socialistic tradition is strong in German academic circles and neo-Nazi activities may easily be

camouflaged. Particular reference should be paid to scientific organizations in view of the Nazi emphasis on science and technoligy as a means of political power.

4. Middle class occupational organizations.

5. Veterans organizations.

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APPENDIX "A" of 2455

GERMAN PLANS FOR UNDERGROUND OPERATIONS FOLLOWING SURRENDER

1. German intentions and capabilities for organizing underground operations following surrender

On the basis of available information, it may be stated that the Nazis intend to go underground after the German surrender. Their activities will be directed primarily against the democratic forces in Germany in order to postpone or prevent the establishment of a postwar anti-Nazi government. They will attempt furthermore to provoke the occupation forces and compromise Allied policies in order to discredit them in the eyes of the German people.

The purpose of such a clandestine Nazi movement will be to prepare for the reintroduction of Nazi policies into Germany. The movement will express not merely the aims of the former Nazi Party, but the aspirations of those sections of German society which are traditionally, both in economic and social terms, the standard bearers of reaction within Germany and the advocates of external aggression. Such groups include the Junkers, the leading groups in industry, the officers corps and those elements of the middle class which have been dispossessed and yet hope to recover their property. A clandestine Nazi movement is thus likely to be the screen behind which all the forces dedicated to reaction and aggression are likely to unite.

This does not imply that the new movement will operate under its old ideology. It may, as the situation requires, camouflage itself as a democratic movement or it may chose the ideology of National Bolshevism in order to attract mass support.

For obvious reasons the Nazis have not announced any plans for the formation of a clandestine movement, nor has much intelligence been

received which bears directly on the problem. The evidence to support the conclusion that the Nazis intend to go underground is drawn from intelligence reports on certain developments within Germany which could foreshadow the creation of a clandestine movement, from the nature of the Nazi Party and its known methods of political action, and from the historic precedents of nationalistic activism in Germany.

The available intelligence concerning the Nazi intentions to form an underground may be summarized as follows:

1. The Nazis are said to be training leaders for future resistance groups in the schools for the Party elite. The graduates of these schools, who are trusted Party members in Germany and in the occupied and satellite states, are relatively unknown to the public and thus will be able to escape immediate detection. They are allegedly studying the tactics of sabotage, coercion and terror, emphasizing the history of the resistance of German groups against the occupation of the Rhineland by Allied forces and against the French in the Ruhr in 1923.

2. The Party is reported to have established a special division--Abteilung IV, Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Division IV, Reich Main Security Office)--for the enrollment of trusted Party members as illegal fighters to carry out the NN Plan (Nach Niederlage Plan, or Post-Defeat Plan). This plan is alleged to seek the integration and control under Nazi leadership of resistance in Germany as well as in all parts of the world. The Army is alleged to have a key role in this plan. According to French sources of 1943, General von Stülpnagel, onetime military commander in occupied France, was put in control of the Army's postwar activities.

3. It is reported that the Nazi Party has transferred considerable sums to neutral states, particularly to Portugal and Switzerland, to be

used to finance subversive activities after the war.

4. The Nazis are reported to be preparing a "last-ditch" stand which calls for "permanent resistance" to be carried out by small bands of men operating in territories suitable to guerilla warfare, such as southern Germany and Austria. The plan is said to include provisions for supporting a few minor officials in Germany to form a government which would ostensibly collaborate with the Allies but would at the same time provide the Nazi underground with an appropriate scapegoat.

In addition to the reports concerning Nazi intentions, arguments for the possible formation of a Nazi underground may be drawn from an analysis of the adaptability of the Nazi Party to clandestine activity and the historic precedents of opposition in Germany to foreign control.

In view of its previous training, the Nazi Party will easily provide the leadership for a clandestine movement. The Party has at its disposal formations and organizations which cover all phases of public and private life in Germany. Although the Party will be formally dissolved and its leadership subject to punishment as determined by Allied policy, it will be difficult to prevent many of these organizations and formations from continuing to exist in clandestine form. They will probably not go underground as mass organizations, but will consist of a few trusted members who will secretly build the skeleton form of an illegal Nazi machine able to persuade or coerce other individuals into supporting its objectives.

If this form is adopted, the Party will be following in modified form the policy which brought it to power in 1933. Prior to the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in 1933, the Nazi Party formed a state within the state which paralleled most of the administrative functions carried out by the German state. This comprehensive machine was built up and maintained not so much through underground activity as through a clever utilization of democratic rights and liberties. A similar device could again be utilized in the construction of an illegal machine which would command the loyalty of various

agents or groups and persuade sections of the German population to support its illegal activity.

The Nazi Party also has at its disposal an efficient terror apparatus in the form of the Security Service of the SS, which is accustomed to act in secret and could easily be adapted to the needs of an underground. A terror apparatus does not need to be large or extensive, for it can use the simple weapons of blackmail, threat of exposure, and assassination to coerce the German people.

The Nazi underground will have at its disposal, furthermore, a supply of arms drawn from the caches now scattered throughout Germany for the use of the police and security forces, including the SS and the various para-military organizations. Prior to defeat, arms may be secreted in the homes of Party members who will be designated to carry on resistance. The only way in which these arms can be detected is by the cooperation of anti-Nazis among the local population.

The Nazi Party, furthermore, in its espionage and counter-espionage activities possessed regular facilities for the issuance of false identity papers. These facilities could be utilized by the agents trained in the Party schools or members specifically designated to conduct resistance activity who will have need to change or conceal their identity. Prior to defeat, the leaders of resistance groups may be provided with a false identity which would make their detection difficult, especially in the urban centers. It is definately known, furthermore, that the destruction of police records in the bombing of Germany has enabled many individuals to move elsewhere and establish a new identity. The Nazis will undoubtedly utilize this circumstance to provide cover for their underground agents.

It can be assumed that the Nazi Party will have funds which can be utilized to finance an underground in Germany. The Party has probably

had funds for private and political use deposited in foreign banks which can be utilized without control by the Reich financial agencies. At the present time, these funds can be replenished out of export proceeds and a sufficient surplus exists to permit their use for Party purposes. One report states that certain firms, such as Siemens, Zeiss, and others are sending quantities of industrial goods to Spain without demanding a down payment by Spanish dealers. They ask for payment only when the goods are sold or for reimbursement after the war by a deposit of money in local banks. Other reports, stating that large German gold consignments have been sent to Swiss and Portuguese banks, interpret this move as part of the plan to accumulate foreign funds to finance an underground. The countries which may provide the most probable depositories for Nazi funds include Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, Spain and South American countries, particularly Argentina.

2. The probable organization, strength and methods of operation of the underground movement

The number of Germans who will engage in resistance activity will probably be small in proportion to the population, but they will represent a trained and powerful minority possessing the means for carrying out acts of violence and in German nationalism they will find a basis for securing an increasing amount of popular support. Defeat, occupation and the terms of peace will cause a reaction among German nationalists, for which any occupation policy which may be adopted will be considered "harsh" by the professional activists in Germany as well as by any group sharing the German nationalist traditions.

Since the last war, numerous professional activists in Germany have received varied and efficient training in the methods of seizing power by any means at their disposal. After the armistice in 1918, the spontaneous reaction to defeat and demilitarization brought about the formation of Free Corps, volunteer military groups determined to fight against any change in the German frontiers or against the democratic government which accepted the terms of peace. These corps fought also against the democratic regime in Germany and the occupation forces in the Rhineland, and against the Poles and Russians on the Eastern frontier. In 1919-20, they had as many as 400,000 members. After 1920 they were gradually dissolved by government order and Allied pressure, or were absorbed into the Reichswehr or the Nazi Party.

Many activists in the Free Corps, however, refused to accept the dissolution of their groups and continued their activities throughout the Weimar period. They founded a number of secret societies which engaged in illegal collection of arms and military training. These groups had widely different political orientations but all aimed at the revival of German power, the destruction of the peace settlement and the overthrow of the Weimar republic. By means of Feme murders, they punished any member who betrayed the secrets of the group, and by means of political

murders they sought to advance their program in German politics.

In 1922-1923, the Army attempted to integrate the members of the various clandestine groups into a secret military reserve known as the Black Reichswehr. Many thousands were enrolled in this secret organization which flouted the treaty provisions for the demilitarization of Germany. In the Berlin district alone, over 18,000 members were under the control of former Free Corps leaders who were under the direct supervision of the Army. After 1923, the Army dropped the Black Reichswehr which had become increasingly embarrassing both for the maintenance of working relations between the government and the Army and between Germany and the foreign states.

After the fight against the French in the Ruhr in 1923, the activists who had formerly operated through the secret groups and Black Reichswehr entered the Nazi Party where they used the same methods of terror and subversion to achieve their ends. The Nazi Party, with its superior control apparatus, was able to integrate the work of the activists into the Nazi pattern; those who could not be controlled were eliminated in the Blood Purge of 1934.

It may be assumed that after the present war there will be a far greater number of activists who are determined and prepared to resist violently than existed after the last war. And in comparison with the illegal fighters of 1919-20, the activists after this war will have been trained professionally by many years of Nazi rule.

The success of the Nazi underground depends on the degree of support which the activists are able to command in the German population. The extent of popular support in turn depends on the social conditions which exist in Germany, and the nature of occupation policy. Even if the great majority of the German people supports the occupation policies,

people, there will remain a large reservoir from which support of the Nazi underground can be derived or activists recruited to engage in violence.

The greatest single source of agents and popular support will be the militant members of the Nazi Party and its affiliated organizations. Intelligence derived from interrogations of Nazi prisoners of war indicate the extent of their fanatical support of National Socialism and Hitler, the methods of espionage they have adopted in their units to detect anti-Nazi elements, and their condescending attitudes towards Allied interrogation officers. To prevent the formation of a Nazi underground it will be necessary to control the entire membership of the Nazi formations.

In addition to the Party members in Germany, the Volksdeutsche who are sent to Germany from neighboring states will provide a potential source for an underground. They have been the spearhead of the Nazi movement throughout Europe since 1933, and their ejection from their present domiciles (such as Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia) will probably make them susceptible to appeals for resistance. Likewise, the Germans who may be dispossessed by territorial changes in areas such as East Prussia, will provide potential material for a Nazi resistance movement. Within Germany, dispossessed social groups, such as the landed aristocrats or any other economic group whose property has been wiped out during the war or expropriated by occupation policy may be important in underground activity. Support may also be drawn from professional soldiers unless this group is subject to control after demobilization.

The progressive decentralization of the Nazi Party which has taken place under the impact of total war may indicate the nature of the organization which the Nazi underground can assume. This

decentralization in the fields of civil defence and local security may provide an efficient post-war organization, seemingly unpolitical, but in reality, neo-Nazi in character, which would of necessity have to exist underground until such time it could emerge as a political group. The decentralization of control thus provides a cover for an apparently neutral organization which would consist of the smallest possible groups able to function independently with a minimum of communication with each other. This would imply that each group would be under the control of a leader specifically chosen for underground work. The Nazi organization would thus cease to exist in its present centralized form,,maintaining only an apparatus to exercise clandestine control over the local units in matters of grand political strategy. The local groups would be self-sufficient in so far as leadership in day-to-day activities is concerned.

The immediate objective of a Nazi resistance movement, limited by the realities of defeat and surrender, will probably be the disruption and compromising of the activities and policies of Allied Military Government and the creation of antagonisms among the occupying powers. In addition to the obvious weapons of underground warfare, the best means to achieve this objective would be the fostering of conflicts between various social groups in Germany to prevent the consolidation of a stable democratic front. Consequently, a neo-Nazi movement would not only carry out sporadic acts of violence against the occupation forces and civil affairs officers, but would attack violently any German group which collaborated with the United Nations in building up a peaceful and democratic Germany. The most obvious tactics in this regard would be the characteristic Nazi weapons of terror and infiltration. Key men placed in administrative offices, business and public associations could sabotage the work of any pro-Allied German government and prepare for a future seizure of power at an appropriate time. The movement could

also work through unpolitical groups as Chambers of Commerce, Business Associations, Engineers and Technicians which are susceptible to Nazi policies but are not as publicly compromised as the Party itself.

There are indications, for example, that support for a neo-Nazi movement may come from certain groups in business and in the state administration which have avoided open identification with the Nazi regime. These groups may even present themselves as collaborators of the Allies, but at the same time may work as the backers of a Nazi underground.

The Nazi party will have at its disposal many means of concealing and camouflaging its agents and supporters. It is probable that agents will be planted in such administrative services as welfare and charitable organizations, fire brigades, rural police, etc., which by their nature are not subject to the same type of scrutiny and control as the more suspect parts of the administrative structure. Personnel officers who are Nazi sympathizers may use their powers to facilitate the infiltration of subversive agents. It is likely, however, that whatever planting of agents is done will have been carried out before defeat and military occupation.

In addition, there are many types of group camouflage which can be utilized to cover a Nazi resistance movement. The most prevalent type of group camouflage used in Germany is the sports association which has effectively covered the activities of Nazis and anti-Nazis alike in the past. Excellent possibilities of group camouflage exist in the Kulturvereine, particularly those which are dedicated to the perpetuation of national traditions. Since the nationalistic tradition is strong in German academic circles, a cover for resistance activities may be found in academic societies, particularly those which are built around technology and German history. Effective guises could also be found in middle-class occupational organizations and in veterans societies.

The thorough training and indoctrination of reliable formations during the ten years of Nazi domination make the prospective Nazi underground an effective and dangerous weapon. By virtue of their totalitarian control over all spheres of public and private life, the Nazis have numerous and varied facilities for camouflaging their actions and probably a large fanatical following which will continue to seek the National Socialist goal. The possibilities for underground activities are therefore almost limitless and will be exceedingly difficult to detect and control.

3. Prospective strength of Nazi underground in the various regions of Germany

1. Northwestern Region

This region is politically and economically the least homogeneous one. It comprise areas of the greatest industrial concentration as well as extensive rural districts and includes regions where Nazi strength is found/at both its highest and lowest levels. The Rhineland and the Ruhr region have, moreover, a strong tradition of active and passive resistance against occupation troops and of para-military organizations (1918-1923). Moreover, influential groups among the Ruhr industry/ialists were among the oldest and staunchest supporters of the Nazi movement and have long favored an expansionist-aggressive policy.

The factors, which make the Northwestern region a territory well suited for Nazi activities, may be partly neutralized by the strength of the labor movement, the predominantly Catholic population in the Rhineland, the probable passivity of the rural population in the Northern parts of the territory, and the fact that the region is not favorable topographically to guerilla warfare. It should be observed, however, that the rural population here supplied the largest Nazi vote, and if the economic conditions of the farmers deteriorate the area may become a base for sabotage operations.

It is more than probable that a well-organized Nazi underground will be formed, but it is not likely that any large-scale activity will prevail in this region. Instead, individual acts of sabotage and terror can be expected.

2. Central German Region

The region has a political and economic structure similar to the Northwestern region, but has a much less stable democratic labor movement.

It is an area of intense political divisions with heavy concentration of Nazis and of Communists and a relatively weak Social Democratic movement. Moreover this region, which was the field of widespread communist guerilla warfare in 1923 is well suited for military and para-military resistance (Harz mountains, Thuringia).

3. South German Region

With the exception of the Palatinate and Franconia, this region had always delivered a rather low Nazi vote. Intelligence reports indicate that it is today perhaps the strongest non-Nazi area in Germany (besides Berlin and Hamburg).

The Southern part of this region is most suitable for guerilla warfare, however, and the Nazis are reported to be concentrating their preparations for continued resistance in this part of the country.

4. Eastern Region

The region comprises the vast agricultural area of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Eastern Brandenburg, and the highly industrialized area of Saxony and Silesia. With the exception of Saxony (a center of labor strength), the region was the testing ground for large-scale Free Corps activities after the first World War, which were supported and protected by the Junkers who dominate this region. Nationalistic sentiment will be high in the entire region, and strong Nazi activities in all forms must be expected. Silesia is, moreover, well suited for guerilla warfare.